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INTRODUCTION

Since the emergence of the Chicago School in the 1980s, U.S. antitrust policy has
been evolving into a legal body of increasing economic sophistication. Gone are the days
in which courts employed impressionistic assessments of competitive harm in construing
challenged business practices.1 Promoting the welfare of the consumer, economically
defined, appears to have emerged as the sole legitimate goal of the antitrust laws.2 Yet,
one area of antitrust jurisprudence—product tying—has remained surprisingly resistant to
the recent surge of economic analysis and continues to be regarded with hostility on an
almost ubiquitous basis by the courts.3 It is here that one finds the last refuge of the
Harvard School, according to which equitable wealth distribution and harm to
competitors must be considered as legitimate antitrust concerns.4 The law governing

* Alan Devlin, BBLS (NUID), LL.M, J.S.D. (Chicago), JD candidate 2007, Stanford
Law School. The author would like to thank Judge Richard Posner and Professor Richard
Craswell for their learned and helpful guidance.
1
See, e.g., Stephen Ross, Network Effects and the Limits of GTE Sylvania’s Efficiency
Analysis, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 945, 945-965 (2001).
2
See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (holding that the Sherman
Act creates a "consumer welfare prescription”); ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A
POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 427 (New York: Free Press 2d ed. 1993) (arguing that the sole
purpose of the antitrust laws is to promote consumer welfare); William J. Kolasky, U.S. and EU
competition
policy:
Cartels,
Mergers,
and
Beyond,
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/9848.pdf (noting that “the ultimate goal of any sound
competition policy must be consumer welfare, which competition advances through lower prices,
higher output and enhanced innovation.”); Chang, Evans & Schmalensee, Has the Consumer
Harm Standard Lost its Teeth? (2002) at 1, http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=332021 (“[C]onsumer
welfare is the fundamental standard for evaluating competitive effects.”). See generally Robert H.
Lande, Consumer Choice as the Ultimate Goal of Antitrust, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 503 (2001).
3
See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958) (holding that tie-ins “are
unreasonable in and of themselves whenever a party has sufficient economic power with respect
to the tying product”).
4
See, e.g., Thomas A. Piraino, Sharp Dealing: The Horizontal/Vertical Dichotomy in
Distributor Termination Cases, 38 EMORY L.J. 311, 313 (1989).

tying arrangements is now a focal point of tension between the two major antitrust
philosophies: Chicago and Harvard.5
Interestingly, the courts’ construction of tying behavior by dominant firms
remains ostensibly focused, at least in part, on the well being of the consumer.6
Importantly, however, the theory of consumer harm typically put forward by the courts
within this realm is not one based on economics. It is instead based on a more
impressionistic notion of consumer injury. This leads to an interesting issue: are the
principles of neoclassical price theory sufficiently capable of protecting consumers? The
courts and some academics appear skeptical as to whether such faith in microeconomics
is warranted, particularly in the context of product tying where demonstrable market
deficiencies, including imperfect competition and information asymmetries, may
accompany explicit injury to competitors.
This Article is driven by what the author perceives to be a fundamental
shortcoming in the economic analysis of the phenomenon of tying, both by the judiciary
and the academy. While many academicians have correctly noted the unsatisfactory
nature of the current law,7 their commentary has yet to provide a workable legal standard
by which to readily and effectively dichotomize consumer-welfare enhancing instances of
5

See, e.g., The Antitrust Legacy of the Rehnquist-O’Connor Court, 20 SUMMER
ANTITRUST 8, 10 (2006); Gordon B. Spivack & Carolyn T. Ellis, Kodak: Enlightened Antitrust
Analysis and Traditional Tying Law, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 203, 214 (1993) (noting the “ongoing
debate . . . among antitrust practitioners, scholars, and members of the judiciary as to whether the
antitrust laws foster goals other than economic efficiency”).
6
See, e.g., United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 44-45 (1962) (noting that tying
arrangements are an object of antitrust concern as “they may force buyers into giving up the
purchase of substitutes for the tied product”).
7
See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 197-207 (University of Chicago Press 2d
ed. 2001); BORK, supra note 2, at 365-81; David S. Evans & Michael Salinger, Why do Firms
Bundle and Tie? Evidence from Competitive Markets and Implications for Tying Law, 22 YALE J.
ON REG. 37 (2005); Nalebuff, Bundling, Tying and Portfolio Effects, DTI Economics Paper No. 1
at 21 (2003), http://www.dti.gov.uk/ccp/publications.htm; Ward S. Bowman, Tying Arrangements
and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957).

tying behavior from the more injurious forms such practices can take. It will be submitted
that neoclassical microeconomic theory is indeed capable of making reliable predictions
of the effect of tying on consumer welfare.
Product tying occurs when a seller conditions the sale of a product or service (“the
tying product”) on the purchase of a second product or service (“the tied product”).8
Bundling—a closely related concept—is said to exist when two or more products are sold
in fixed proportions; while requirements tie-in sales involve consumers being compelled
under contract, or otherwise,9 to purchase all future tied products from the tying firm.10
Whence comes the objection to product tying? Competition law has condemned
the practice on the grounds: (1) of inherent unfairness to consumers, in that they are being
effectively coerced into accepting a second, “tied” product that they do not necessarily
desire;11 (2) that an undertaking with considerable market power in the tying market may
seek to extend its monopoly power into a second, otherwise competitive, market through
the leveraging effects of product tying;12 and (3) that tying arrangements create
considerable barriers to entry, thereby enhancing the market power of the undertaking
engaged in tying, by forcing potential entrants to enter the tied market, if at all, only by
entering the tying market as well.

8

2005).

9

See, e.g., CARLTON & PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (Pearson 4th ed.

Various pricing techniques such as discount rebates may be found to have an equivalent
effect to a contractual tie.
10
CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 8, at 321.
11
See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984) ("[T]he
essential characteristic of an invalid tying arrangement lies in the seller's exploitation of its
control over the tying product to force the buyer into the purchase of a tied product that the buyer
either did not want at all, or might have preferred to purchase elsewhere on different terms.”).
12
Evans & Salinger, supra note 7, at 38 (“The pre-Chicago case law claimed that tying
was an attempt to leverage a monopoly in one market to another.”).

These grounds may strike the reader as providing an entirely reasonable
foundation for U.S. law’s qualified per se prohibition of product tying, but, as this Article
shall strive to make clear, the foregoing objections are based on an economically
uninformed view of the business world. Current U.S. law, which holds a company guilty
of abusing its dominant position when employing tying arrangements that damage
competitors in the tied market, is misguided and ought to be reversed.
This Article shall proceed in five stages. First, the competing schools of antitrust
jurisprudence will be introduced and the law as currently applicable in the United States
will be presented. Second, the difficult and interesting issue of monopoly leverage will be
analyzed in considerable detail. The “single monopoly mark-up constraint” will be
explored as a concept excluding the possibility of successful leverage. Though under
attack from post-Chicago theorists, the continuing force of the constraint shall be
demonstrated. Nevertheless, a limited number of scenarios will be shown to exist in
which the constraint may be circumvented, though not directly violated. Here,
information and efficiency asymmetries, in addition to markets characterized by severe
entry barriers, will be shown to facilitate the possibility of consumer harm. Third, the
objection to tying on the base of inherent unfairness to consumers will be considered and
shown to be spurious. Fourth, the unique challenges posed by new economy industries
will be explored in the context of tying arrangements. Last, and consistent with the
preceding discussion, a novel legal standard will be presented which, if enacted, would
lead to an optimal outcome with respect to the consumer welfare standard.

I. THE ROLE OF CONSUMER WELFARE IN ANTITRUST LAW

A. The Role of the Chicago School

The Chicago School’s influence over U.S. competition law has been immense and
has unequivocally set the consumer welfare standard as the benchmark for antitrust
inquiries.13 A compendious discussion of the school’s fundamental tenets and the
influence it has had on antitrust law provide the necessary foundation from which to
consider the nature and direction of the law’s treatment of product tying.14
In order to understand the Chicago School approach to antitrust, one must
appreciate the economic objections to monopoly, for it is against such evils that
Chicagoans seek to employ competition law.
The basic objection to monopoly results from the profit-maximizing strategy
pursued by an undertaking which is unconstrained by competition. In maximizing profits,
a monopolist will produce at the point where the marginal cost of producing another unit
of output equals the marginal revenue which would be gained by selling that unit.15 As a
monopolist faces a downward-sloping demand curve, the price it charges for a given unit
will necessarily be larger than the marginal cost of producing that unit.16 As a result, the
monopolist earns positive economic profits.

13

See, e.g., Thomas J. Horton & Dr. Stefan Schmitz, A Tale of Two Continents: The
Coming Clash of the Conflicting Economic Viewpoints in Europe and the United States,
http://www.orrick.com/fileupload/205.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2006) (noting “the reverence and
deference the Chicago School has received in the United States”).
14
See generally Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA.
L. REV. 925 (1979).
15
See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 8, at 91.
16
Id. at 89.

Why the objection? There are two fundamental reasons. First, by charging a price
above marginal cost, a deadweight loss is created for society in the form of foregone
transactions that would have taken place but for the supracompetitive pricing.17
Essentially, there are consumers who value the product or service at a level at or beyond
the marginal cost to society of producing it, but who are nevertheless denied access to it.
As a result, there is a loss in value as some consumers satisfy their demand by switching
to goods that require more of society’s scarce resources to produce.18 In this sense,
perverse incentives are created: a consumer believes she is acquiring an equivalent
product, but in fact is purchasing a product that costs society more to produce.19
The second objection to above-marginal cost pricing is that it creates perverse
incentives on the part of a would-be monopolist to expend resources on acquiring and
maintaining a monopolistic position. At the limit, such an undertaking would be willing
to spend a sum equal to the discounted present value of its expected monopoly profits on
obtaining that position.20 This behavior is known as rent seeking and such expenditure
constitutes social waste.21
The Chicago approach to antitrust policy is aimed solely at avoiding the various
evils associated with monopoly identified above. Therefore, the twin aims of maximizing
consumer welfare and efficiency emerge as the combined source of competition policy.
To achieve these aims, Chicagoans look to price theory as the means by which to inform
the construction of efficiency- and wealth-maximizing rules. Accordingly, harm to
17

See, e.g., JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MICROECONOMICS 357–361(Addison Wesley
Longman 2d ed. 2004); WALDMAN & JENSEN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 42–44 (Addison
Wesley Longman 2d ed. 2001).
18
See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 278 (Aspen 6th ed. 2003).
19
See POSNER, supra note 7, at 12.
20
Id. at 17.
21
Id. at 17.

individual competitors and rising market concentration do not, in themselves, raise
antitrust concern. Instead, the relevant issue focuses exclusively on the question of
whether price and quality are going to be rendered inferior or superior on the basis of the
challenged conduct.
The classic Chicago School found, and continues to find, almost all unilateral
business practices to be undeserving of antitrust attention, believing that natural market
forces provide a superior remedy than the law.
The post-Chicago School adopts Chicago’s central tenet that consumer welfare is
the sole, relevant consideration, but places less faith in the functioning of the market
place. Accordingly, post-Chicago scholars advocate a more interventionist approach,
believing that the legal system is often capable of correcting distortions more quickly
than the market. Regardless, microeconomics remains the post-Chicago analyst’s tool and
the ultimate consideration remains the same: does the practice at issue elevate consumer
welfare and economic efficiency?22
What is clear is that the Chicago and post-Chicago theories have near-total control
over antitrust law in the modern day. The law governing tying arrangements constitutes a
quite dramatic instance of divergence.

22

See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and Critique, 2001
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 257 (2001).

B. The Harvard School

Although largely discredited in most settings, the Harvard School’s influence
nevertheless remains controlling in the realm of tying law. The Harvard School rejects
the Chicago contention that maximizing consumer welfare is the sole aim of competition
policy. Instead, Harvard followers look beyond purely economic considerations to such
political and social ideals as equitable distribution of capital and freedom of access to
markets.23
The heyday of the Harvard School was the 1960s, during which time the Warren
Court embraced the view that antitrust law promotes the well being of small business and
general equity, in addition to consumers.24 Moreover, any practice that constituted a
hindrance to contractual and economic freedom to engage in direct competition was
condemned.25

23

See, e.g., Andreas Kirsch & William Weesner, Can Antitrust Law Control ECommerce? A Comparative Analysis in Light of U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Law, 12 U.C. DAVIS J.
INT’L L. & POL’Y 297, 304-05 (2006) (“In contrast, Harvard School Interventionists want
antitrust law to promote goals such as guaranteeing free access to markets, providing customers
with the widest choice of suppliers and the [sic] preventing abuse of economic power.”). See
generally Schwartz, 'Justice' and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
1076 (1979); Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (1979).
24
See, e.g., Michael S. Jacobs, An Article on the Normative Foundations of Antitrust
Economics, 74 N.C. L. REV. 219, 226-28 (1995) (describing the Harvard School’s influence on
antitrust policy during the Warren Court era). For the classic, illustrative example of the Warren
Court’s adoption of Harvard School thinking, see Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294
(1962).
25
See, e.g., Alan Messe, Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of the Reason, 2003 U.
ILL. L. REV. 77, 124 (2003) (describing the inhospitality tradition of the era as taking “the form of
extreme hostility toward any contractual restraint on the freedom of individuals or firms to
engage in head-to-head rivalry”).

Much of the Warren Court era’s precedent was subsequently overruled as the
Chicago School approach gained prominence.26 Despite this, the Harvard Schoolinfluenced law with respect to product tying has remained far more stubborn in its refusal
to budge.27 The burning question is: why?
The answer, almost certainly, lies in the nature of the effect of product tying on
the market. One strains to identify an area of antitrust law in which the relative virtues
and objections to the practice raise almost every conceivable point of contention between
the competing ideologies of the Chicago and Harvard Schools. As will become clear
shortly, a tying arrangement can, given the right circumstances, enable a tying firm to
deprive rivals of access to their customers in tied markets. The afflicted firms not only
have their freedom to consumers constrained, but they may ultimately be forced to exit
their markets. Yet, there may be no concomitant reduction in consumer wealth.28 Clearly,
the ideals of the Chicago and Harvard Schools stand in tension.

26

See, e.g., Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (overruling the
Warren Court decision in United States v. Arnold Schwinn, 388 U.S. 365 (1967) and holding that
vertical non-price based restraints are to be judged under the rule of reason); State Oil Co. v.
Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) (overruling the Warren Court’s holding that vertically-imposed
maximum price restraints are illegal per se); see also Jacobs, supra note 24 at 220-21.
27
There have been some instances of attempted evolution within the field toward
Chicago, but they have been few and far between. See, e.g., Illinois Tool Works Inc. v.
Independent Ink, Inc., 126 S.Ct. 1281 (2006) (rejecting the assumption that patents confer market
power for the purposes of an antitrust tying claim); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde,
466 U.S. 1 (1984) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing for rejection of the per se illegal standard in
tying cases).
28
See, e.g., Jonathan M. Jacobson, Exclusive Dealing, “Foreclosure,” and Consumer Harm, 70
ANTITRUST L.J. 311, 311 (2002) (opining that “the highest levels of percentage foreclosure may
entail no consumer harm”).

C. The Supreme Court’s Treatment of Product Tying

Having considered the preceding schools of thought, the ensuing task is to
ascertain how the goal of consumer welfare is, and should be, forwarded by the law in the
context of product tying. Armed with knowledge of the Chicago and Harvard Schools,
consider the following hypothetical:
A large firm, Alpha, operates in two markets. The first market, where Alpha has
100% market share, is for widgets and the second market, where Alpha has a 10% share,
is for blodgets. Blodgets are necessary complements for widgets.29 Alpha decides to tie
the sale of the two products in variable proportions, so that a consumer in deciding to
purchase a widget must only buy blodgets from Alpha. As a result, Alpha’s market share
in the tied market rises to approach monopoly levels. Alpha’s competitors, having been
ruined, cry foul. They proclaim that competition in both markets has been eliminated so
that Alpha now enjoys two monopoly profits at the expense of consumers instead of just
one, that consumers have been coerced into accepting Alpha’s version of the blodget
instead of being free to choose others, and that now it is impossible to re-enter the market
for blodgets without also entering the market for widgets.
Clearly, the above market effects collide directly with the aims of the Harvard
School and, as the Supreme Court has largely accepted the Harvard approach in the tying
context, U.S. law would condemn the above situation. Consistent with the Harvard
School, it has been held that tying arrangements "generally serve no legitimate business

29

Two goods are complementary when a reduction in the price of one increases the
demand for the other.

purpose”30 and that tie-ins both exploit consumers by coercing them to take products they
may not desire31 and create barriers to entry to the tied market.32 Accordingly, they are
unreasonable in and of themselves when the seller has "appreciable economic power in
the tying product market and if the arrangement affects a substantial volume of
commerce in the tied market.”33
This is a modified “per se” standard of liability; as long as a showing of market
power in the tying market and a significant impact on the tied market can be made,
illegality automatically follows.34 Importantly, there is no requirement that harm to
consumers be positively shown. Instead, it is assumed that the two relevant factors
necessarily equate to consumer harm. The accuracy of this assumption will be critiqued
shortly.
But if the Court discarded the Harvard approach and sought to enact antitrust
rules in a manner consistent with the consumer welfare standard, would one expect
Alpha’s behavior, extreme as it is, to be outlawed? Is there any conceivable way to
construe this situation so as to be not merely benign, but enhancive of consumer welfare
and competition? To go further, might the above situation be more likely than not to
benefit consumers?35
For the uninitiated, these questions may seem laughable, the answers self-evident.
Surely, the acquisition of an additional monopoly market share facilitates further
restriction of output, increase in price, and deadweight loss. Moreover, the heightened
30

See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969).
See Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984).
32
See id. at 14-15.
33
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461-462 (1992).
34
Note also that the tying and tied goods must be shown to belong to different markets
for per se illegality to attach. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 9.
35
See Part III.G infra.
31

entry barriers must also prolong the double monopoly. Aren’t these the very phenomena
the Chicago School seeks to protect consumers from? The remainder of this Article will
seek to answer this question by economically assessing the practice of product tying to
ascertain the situations in which tie-ins will, and will not, promote consumer welfare.

II. THE REQUIREMENT OF MONOPOLY POWER

A ready, though oft-overlooked, means by which to immediately distinguish
potentially damaging from benign tying arrangements involves looking to the market power
of the tying firm.

A. Where the Tying Market Is Subject to Competition

In a competitive market, an undertaking will be unable to directly impose any tie
that constitutes a source of disutility for consumers. Should it attempt to do so in a
competitive market characterized by perfect, symmetric information, it will be unable to
make any sales.
In certain cases of information asymmetry, however, it may be possible for a
given round of consumers to be made worse off by a tie when they are “locked in” by the
initial purchase of the tying product. But such disutility will be ephemeral, for there will
be no second round purchasers. More importantly, other areas of law are better suited to
such consumer protection.36 From an economic standpoint, no tie will be capable of
restricting output. Necessarily, then, any tie “imposed” in a competitive market will be
36

See Part IV.C infra.

incapable of diminishing allocative efficiency. Moreover, no such tie will be capable of
having a monopolizing effect on the tied market, unless the tie constitutes such a source
of efficiency that monopolization results in the tying market first. Obviously, this is
implausible, for incumbent competition would similarly impose efficiency-enhancing
ties. It follows that no antitrust issues can be raised by an undertaking imposing a tie from
a competitive market.

B. Where the Tying Firm Has Significant Market Power

In a market in which the tying firm has significant market power, though power
falling short of monopoly power, no antitrust concerns should arise as a result of a tie
imposed on consumers. Note that this is contrary to the current legal standard.
First, monopolization of the tied market cannot result for the consumers of the
tied product, by definition, are not solely comprised of those who purchase from the tying
firm.37 As the tying undertaking does not have a monopoly in the tying market, it has
competitors whose customers will similarly comprise the tied market. The tie cannot lead
to monopolization of the tied market in these circumstances.
Second, an undertaking that does not have a monopoly in the tying market will be
unlikely to enter into a tying arrangement that harms consumers. A tie imposed by a firm
with even significant market power that harms consumers will be a source of competitive
advantage for incumbent rivals in the tying market. One would not expect to see a firm
imposing a disadvantageous tie from the perspective of the consumer unless it faces little
37

See Part III.A infra.

or no competition in the tying market. If a firm does utilize such a tie, a loss in market
share and market power is likely to result, leading to higher levels of allocative efficiency
within the tying market in the long run. Knowing this ex ante, a firm facing even slight
competition will not impose an unwelcome tie, for it will be contrary to its long-term
financial interest.
Third, firms wishing to enter the tied market will not discover themselves to be in
a position where they are incapable of finding consumers to sell to. This is due to the fact
that there are consumers of the tying firm’s competitors who will not be subject to a tie.
By lowering the prevailing price in the tied market, entrants will further increase the
harm to the tying firm of imposing the tie in the tying market. Consumers, in deciding
whether to purchase from the near-monopolist in the tying market, or from one of its
competitors, will take into account the fact that they can get a better deal in the tied
market by purchasing from the latter. The dominant firm will therefore have to drop the
tying restriction or suffer further loss of market share. It follows that a tie-in imposed by
a firm without monopoly power will be incapable of monopolizing the tied market.
Due to the foregoing factors, it can be concluded that a tie-in imposed by a firm
without monopoly power will likely be motivated by efficiency-enhancing objectives.

C. Where the Tying Firm Is a Monopolist

Monopolization of the tied market is capable of following the imposition of a tie
only where the tying firm has monopoly power in the tying market. However, this is a
necessary but by no means sufficient condition with regard to the questions both of

consumer harm and, indeed, whether monopolization will in fact result. These questions
shall now be addressed..

III. THE IMPLAUSIBILITY OF MONOPOLY LEVERAGE

It is now assumed that a tying firm’s monopoly power in the tying market has
been established. It is with this assumption that the analysis of product tying becomes
interesting.
It seems fitting to begin with the most intuitively powerful objection to product
tying, namely that it facilitates the acquisition of additional monopoly power. The process
by which a company supposedly acquires such incremental power in a neighboring
market is known as “leveraging.” The position will be taken that leverage is a specious
and vacant concept that serves only to confuse and mislead, rather than to clarify.
The fundamental point to be taken from the upcoming discussion is the counterintuitive one that a distinction exists between market share and market power; only the
latter enables the restriction of output and the diminution of consumer welfare. Given the
economic nature of the phenomena, market share acquired and maintained via a tying
arrangement is artificial and quite unlike market share existing on a unilateral basis. Price
theory can explain why, both in the context of vertical and conglomerate expansion.

A. When Will Tying Allow a Firm To Monopolize a Tied Market?

Before considering the extent to which the acquisition of market share
corresponds to the attainment of market power, it must first be understood under what
conditions a tie-in will cause monopolization of a tied market. If a tie-in does not have
such an effect, there is clearly no threat of monopoly power being acquired.38
Successful accumulation of extensive market share in the tied market will occur
only where the purchasers of the tying product account for all, or substantially all, of the
sales of the tied product. Moreover, a sine qua non for acquisition of market share is that
the utility consumers derive from the tying product significantly exceed that conferred by
the tied product and that the tied product be purchased as a complement for the more
valuable tying product.
What is the consequence of a tie in the absence of these requirements? The
answer is that there will be no monopolization and no possibility of consumer harm. So,
in a case where the manufacturer of a printing machine makes the sale of its machine
subject to the purchase of ink from it too, it could not be said that there was any
possibility of the manufacturer monopolizing the market for ink.39 Here, it can be seen
that the consumers in the tied market—the market for ink—are comprised of many more
economic actors than those who buy printing machines. Many people and companies
purchase ink other than for use with those machines. There is, therefore, no feasible risk
of monopolization.

38

Correctly, U.S. law does not object to tying arrangements which do not lead to market
share acquisition in tied markets. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504
U.S. 451, 461-462 (1992).
39
See POSNER, supra note 7, at 198.

In contrast, take the example of the most famous antitrust litigation of recent
times involving product tying, the Microsoft case.40 There, Microsoft bundled the sale of
its Windows operating system with its internet browsing software, Explorer. In these
circumstances, there are few, if any, consumers who could or would utilize internet
browsing software without an operating system. As it appears that Microsoft held an
effective monopoly over the market for operating software,41 it follows that few, if any,
consumers of internet browsing software could employ such software without also
employing Microsoft Windows as the operating system. As a result, it seems clear that by
tying Windows and Explorer, Microsoft was able to acquire a large share of the market
for internet browsing software.42 This is as clear an example of monopolization as one is
likely to encounter, but this is not the end of the inquiry. The following discussion
explores how such “monopolization” is, in fact, typically benign when perpetuated by
means of a tying arrangement.

40

United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
See, e.g., Benjamin Klein, An Economic Analysis of Microsoft’s Conduct, 14 Fall
ANTITRUST 38, 38 (1999). But see Testimony of Richard Schmalensee,
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/msdoj/trial.html.
42
It should be noted, however, that this statement fails to incorporate the specific nature
of the tied market in this case, for the marginal cost to a consumer of installing a second internet
browsing program is small. Nevertheless, the point remains that almost every consumer who
desired internet browsing software needed an operating system first. As the latter product
contained the former product, extensive acquisition of market share should be expected to follow,
unless Microsoft’s Internet Explorer was not of comparable quality with the product offered by
rivals.
41

B. Tying to Vertically Integrate

The first illustration of how market share, gained through a tie, will not equate to
market power arises in the context of vertical integration. This provides a more readily
understandable introduction to the concept than conglomerate expansion.
It is possible for firms to employ tying arrangements to achieve integration—not
horizontally, for no firm would ever tie an interchangeable, competing product with its
own—but vertically. So, for example, an undertaking may desire to extend its operations
“downstream” to control distribution. Thus, a manufacturer, displeased with the level of
quality or cost-effectiveness being provided by its distributors or by their lack of
intrabrand price competition, may wish to increase its own profits by vertically
integrating so as to eliminate the inefficiency at the distribution level. If the manufacturer
is a monopolist—that is, it faces no interbrand competition at the competitive price level
in the tying market—it will be able to acquire 100% of the distribution market by
insisting that any firm or consumer who wishes to purchase its good also avail of its
delivery services. In this sense, the manufacturer “monopolizes” the downstream market
for its own product. Nevertheless, it ought to be clear that this “monopolization” is not
objectionable, for it neither creates further monopoly power for the manufacturer nor
leads to higher prices for consumers.
When a profit-maximizing manufacturer internalizes all aspects of the productive
and distributive processes involved in getting its products to end-users, it will be in its
best interest to minimize its costs in distribution and to charge as low a price for it as
possible so as to increase consumer demand for its product. If this is unclear, consider the

following: the manufacturer’s dream distributor is one who can deliver its goods at zero
cost, for the higher the incremental cost charged by the distributor, the lower the demand
for the manufacturer’s goods will be at any given level of marginal profit per sale. When
the manufacturer takes over distribution by means of a tying arrangement, it will have an
incentive to lower cost downstream so as to elevate demand for its product. This cost
reduction will equate to lower prices for consumers, higher output and elevated consumer
welfare—the very goals the Chicago School seeks to achieve!
The manufacturer, having vertically integrated will of course not charge a higher
price for distribution, for this would be akin to charging a higher price at the
manufacturing level, which presumably had already been set at its most profitable point.
This is our first introduction to the “single monopoly mark-up constraint.”
Just as importantly, though less obviously, the observation can be made that the
manufacturer will not impose a tie so as to reserve the downstream activities for itself
unless it can perform them more efficiently—that is, at lower cost—than other
undertakings. If other firms are more efficient in distribution, it would be in the best
interests of the manufacturer to contract with them so as to achieve a lower overall price
for the consumer and a concomitant increase in demand for its product at the
manufacturing level—a Coasian outcome.43 It follows that competition law ought to have
no quarrel with an undertaking that imposes a tie so as to vertically integrate.
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This is a specific example of a more general proposition that the acquisition of
substantial market share through the employment of tie-ins need not be anticompetitive at
all.

C. Tying to Expand Market Share in Conglomerate Markets

Even where acquisition of market share via a tie-in does not take place within the
same vertical market structure, objectionable monopolization generally does not occur.
This concept may be somewhat more difficult to grasp at an intuitive level than the
preceding one, but price theory provides the answer. First, it will be demonstrated why
the belief that monopolization of a second market through product tying facilitates
monopoly power is erroneous. It will then be shown that “monopolization” of a
conglomerate market is likely to enhance consumer welfare by lowering overall prices.
Imagine that the demand curve facing Alpha in the first market is P = 100 – Q,
while the demand curve for the second market is P = 50 – 2Q. For simplicity, FC1 = FC2
= MC1 = MC2 = 0, where MC = marginal cost; FC = fixed cost. Let us proceed to
demonstrate why tying is typically an ineffective method by which to extend monopoly
power and decrease industrial output.

Market 1 (tying)

Market 2 (tied)

P = 100 – Q

P = 50 – 2Q

MC1 = MC2 = FC1 = FC2 = 0

Competitive price = 0

Competitive price = 0

Competitive quantity = 100

Competitive quantity = 25

Monopoly price =

Monopoly price =

50

Monopoly quantity = 50

Monopoly profit =
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250044

Monopoly quantity = 12.5

Monopoly profit =

Market 1

TR1
TC1
F1

=
=
=
=

P.Q
= P (100 – P)
0
TR1 – TC1
100P – P²

dF1
dP

=

100 – 2P

=

100P – P²

=

50Q – 2Q²

P1 = 50; Q1 = 50, F1 = 2500.
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Market 2

TR2
TC2
F2

=
=
=
=

P.Q
= Q (50 – 2Q)
0
TR2 – TC2
50Q – 2Q²

dF2
dQ

=

50 – 4Q

Q2 = 12.5; P2 = 25, X2 = 312.5.

25

312.545

Consumer surplus = 10,000

Consumer surplus = 1250

(under competition)

(under competition)

Consumer surplus = 2500

Consumer surplus = 312.546

(under monopoly)

(under monopoly)

It will be assumed that Alpha has a monopoly over market one and also operates
within the perfectly competitive market two. Alpha therefore currently enjoys a profit of
2500. Being a profit-maximizing entity, Alpha would like to monopolize market two and,
in so doing, acquire an additional 312.5 in profit. It will be assumed that the relationship
between the two markets is such that the only consumers of the second product are those
who also purchase the first product, and, as can be seen from the respective demand
curves, that consumers value the latter at a higher level than the former. Therefore, the
imposition of a tie-in will lead to the acquisition by Alpha of 100% market share in the
second, tied market and the ostensible exclusion of all incumbent competition. Price
theory can demonstrate why employing a tie will not facilitate the exercise or acquisition
of additional market power to the detriment of consumers.
The Harvard School approach objected to such “monopolization” on the ground
that two monopoly profits would be earned instead of one.47 In essence, the traditional
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view would be that Alpha would charge a single price for both products—assuming that
they are bundled—of 75. This figure represents the sum of the monopoly prices of both
the tying and tied goods. The most cursory application of price theory demonstrates why
this is impossible.
By charging a price for the tying product that is 25 above the monopoly price
level for that product plus the competitive price level for the tied product (which is zero
in this case), consumers deciding whether to purchase the bundled good are faced with
the prospect of purchasing a good that is 25 higher than it was before. The case is
analogous to Alpha offering the tying product alone for 75 and the bundled good being
given away for nothing—–the scenarios are synonymous. Therefore, the demand curve
for the tying good can be considered to be:

P = 100 – Q.

In attempting to charge a double monopoly mark-up, Alpha charges a price of 75.
Therefore, the quantity produced and sold is 25. Alpha’s profit is, therefore, 1875. It need
hardly be pointed out that this is considerably less than the profit of 2500 it enjoyed
before the imposition of the tie and the attempted double monopoly mark-up. It is clear
that an attempt to earn a double monopoly profit will simply result in the firm effectively
charging a price above the profit-maximizing, monopoly price in the tying market and
earning a supracompetitive return on a fewer number of sales.

for the tied product”); United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 154-55 (1948) (holding
that tying arrangements are “devices for stifling competition and diverting the cream of the
business”).

The error arises as a result of the flawed assumption that market share acquired
and maintained via a tie is the same as market share acquired through other means which
would allow the exercise of monopoly power. By reasoning as it did, Alpha neglected the
fact that the second market is subject to perfect competition where the prevailing price is
zero.48 By imposing a tie and charging more than zero above the monopoly price in the
first market, Alpha would be imposing a disutility on consumers—as they would be made
pay more for the tied product than they otherwise would have to—which results in a
declination in demand for Alpha’s goods in the first, tying market.
It follows that no profit-maximizing undertaking will employ a tie in an attempt to
charge a double monopoly mark-up.
The foregoing model has been criticized by the post-Chicago School of antitrust
economics.49 These criticisms will, for the most part, be shown to be unfounded. Even
having refuted the post-Chicago objections to the single monopoly mark-up constraint,
however, adherence to it nevertheless places a lot of faith in microeconomics. If the best
outcome is that we should be indifferent about a tie in terms of consumer welfare and
market power, then if there’s any chance of the single monopoly mark-up constraint
being violated, we would be better off banning the practice entirely. As this Article
highlights a number of instances, albeit severely limited, in which consumer harm may
flow from a tie-in, perhaps the U.S. courts are correct in their hostile approach. Crucially,
however, a plethora of benefits associated with product tying exist. These are:
efficiencies in the form of transaction cost reduction, complementary effects, and price
discrimination. Let us consider these in turn.
48
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D. Transaction Cost Efficiency

We, as consumers, purchase tied products all the time. Not only do we often do so
without complaint, it is unequivocally in our best interests to have many products sold in
bundled form. Indeed, consumers often wish that more tying would take place. A
consumer who purchases an electronic good, only to get home to discover that “batteries
are not included” experiences an annoyance which will undoubtedly be within the
personal experience of the reader. That the manufacturer of the electronic good in
question may hold a dominant position in the market in question, and hence be subject to
possible antitrust scrutiny if it employed a tie, will do little to ease the frustration of the
consumer.
There are innumerable examples of firms engaging in explicit product ties without
any hint of commensurate antitrust attention or consumer displeasure. In these
circumstances, the efficiencies inherent in a tie far outweigh any objectionable
consequence of the practice.50 So, for example, cars are usually sold with a spare tire,
shirts are sold with buttons attached, computers are purchased from original equipment
manufacturers with much software pre-installed, shirts come with buttons, and meals are
sometimes sold a la carte. In these and many other instances, transaction costs are
dramatically lowered by tying arrangements and thus should unequivocally be viewed as
legal.51
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In such circumstances, it can hardly be argued that the tie-ins are anti-competitive
or that consumer welfare is being damaged. Quite to the contrary, tie-ins evidently serve
a pro-competitive, efficiency-enhancing objective.52

E. Complementary Effects

We already know that a tying firm won’t charge a price higher than the
combination of the monopoly price of one product and the competitive price of the other.
An interesting question, though, is whether a tying firm, having gained a monopoly in
both the tying and tied markets, will ever charge a price lower than the combination of
these prices. The answer is yes! This is due to complementary effects.
A firm will rarely employ a tie other than between complementary products.
Importantly, complementary effects can lead to higher output and lower prices when two
or more complementary products are sold by one manufacturer rather than several.
Carlton & Perloff describe the phenomenon as follows:

“[W]hen a single firm prices two complementary products, it takes into account
that lowering the price on one product will stimulate demand for the other. This
demand effect creates an incentive for the firm to set lower prices for both
products than would be set if each product were sold by a different firm. Thus,
one should expect lower prices and consumer benefits . . . ”53
Some have posited, however, that a tie between complementary products in
variable proportions is inherently objectionable as an instance of objectionable leverage.
If true, this seriously undermines the foregoing economic analysis demonstrating the
52
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existence of the single monopoly mark-up constraint. Professor Bowman representatively
writes:

“If two products complement each other . . . the price which maximizes return
from the sale of one will depend upon the price at which the other sells . . . when
two complements are used in variable proportions . . . the cross-elasticity of the
complements creates the condition calling for two distinct prices in order to
maximize profit, just as if a single firm had the monopoly of each product. When
product complementarity is involved, the higher price charged for product B is
not a substituted means of charging for product A . . . the result of the tie-in is to
create the equivalent of another monopoly, a monopoly over product B for use
with product A. The tie-in thus yields the equivalent of monopoly by a single
seller over both A and B. Leverage is present; and the tie-in provides the leverage,
since the price and output of one product will necessarily affect the price and
output of the other . . . the tie-in creates the equivalent of a new monopoly of B in
addition to the monopoly of the complementary product A.”54
But this analysis is severely deficient. A tying arrangement between two
complementary products is not at all the same “as if a single firm had the monopoly of
each product.” If that were the case, the tying firm would set marginal revenue equal to
marginal cost and produce the monopoly level of output in each of the tying and tied
markets without regard to the other. But we have already seen how a monopoly price
being set for one complementary product will reduce the demand not only for it, but also
for its complement. Were one of two different firms to each have a monopoly over one of
two complementary products, neither would internalize the negative externality of its
decision to reduce output to the monopoly level. In contrast, where one firm
“monopolized” both markets through product tying—an extraordinarily difficult thing to
do, as we have seen—it will reduce the prices of both goods to find the profit-maximizing
balance between raising price to earn supracompetitive profits and lowering price to
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increase the demand for both goods. This price will be lower than where two monopolists
each held one of the two markets respectively.
Two illustrative scenarios will be assessed and both will involve two markets
comprised of complementary products: the first scenario will involve both markets A and
B being monopolized whilst in the second scenario Market A will be monopolized and
market B will be perfectly competitive. The ensuing instructive examples will
demonstrate how Professor Bowman’s conclusion is erroneous.

Scenario 1:

The first scenario is quite simple, though the inference created thereby powerful.
Alpha is the monopolist of good A in market one, while Beta is the monopolist of good B
in market two. In this case, either one of Alpha or Beta are as likely as the other to
attempt to tie its sales to the goods in the other market. Both could increase their profits
by entering the other’s market, employing a tying arrangement to link the two markets
under a single price and lowering the constituent prices of both goods so as to maximize
the complementary demand-effects.
It is clear in these circumstances that product tying would increase allocative
efficiency. It also illustrates Professor Bowman’s misconception. While both markets one
and two will remain to an extent “monopolized,” due to the fact that market power will
still be exercised in both, the level of output will be higher than it would in a situation
where Alpha and Beta did not enter each other’s markets.

Scenario 2:

Alpha is, once again, the monopolist of good A in market one, except now market
two is subject to competition.
What is the effect of Alpha’s decision to tie the sale of good A to the purchase of
good B? Professor Bowman would have us believe that the effect of the tie-in would be
to yield “the equivalent of monopoly . . . over both A and B.”
There are two points. First, even if Alpha obtains a monopoly market share in
market two, it will necessarily be true that consumers from the first, tying market will be
better off in the short-run as a result of the tie, though consumers in the tied market will
be worse off. It is possible to make this observation, as price in the tying market will have
to be reduced to avail of the complementary demand conditions of selling the tying and
tied goods together. A different question is whether overall consumer welfare,
aggregating markets one and two, will be higher or lower. On these facts, consumer
welfare would rise, though this need not invariably be the case and will depend on the
relationship between the demand curves. However, as the consumers comprising market
two need to derive greater utility from market one in order for monopolization to follow
from a tie, it is more likely than not that the reduction in price in market one will
outweigh the rise in price in market two, in terms of the ensuing effects on consumer
welfare. The worst possible outcome is that net consumer welfare will remain level; were
it to decrease it, the single monopoly mark-up constraint would be violated.
It follows that the complementary effects inherent in most tying arrangements are
a source of consumer welfare-enhancing efficiency and, therefore, counsel for legality.

F. Price Discrimination

A firm with market power may seek to increase the level of its supracompetitive
profits by engaging in price discrimination. By charging its customers who greatly value
its product a higher price than it charges those who value it less, an undertaking in a
dominant position may be able to increase its monopoly profits. In the case of perfect
price discrimination, a monopolist will charge each consumer her reservation price. As a
result, the competitive level of output is produced, so that there is no allocative
inefficiency, though all consumer surplus is transferred to the monopolist. As there is no
misallocation of resources, many would argue that perfect price discrimination is to be
encouraged rather than forbidden by the antitrust laws.
However, there is some force to the observation that a competition policy seeking
to maximize consumer welfare ought to condemn a practice that unequivocally decreases
the wealth of consumers to the advantage of undertakings enjoying a dominant position.
As against that observation, however, it is also true that, absent the price discrimination,
consumers whose reservation prices are above the cost of manufacturing the good, but
below the monopoly price, would be denied access to it where they otherwise would not.
Accordingly, price discrimination is most likely to be of benefit to people of lower socioeconomic background who may have been priced out of the market absent the
discrimination. Accordingly, price discrimination may serve an equitable, as well as an
efficiency-oriented, goal.

An undertaking may employ a tie so as to approximate the result achieved by
direct price discrimination. To do so, a firm with monopoly power can tie its main
product to a necessary complement. By charging a price for the tying product equal to the
reservation price of the consumer whose utility derived from the product equals the
marginal cost of producing the good, the firm would ensure that all consumers who value
the tying product more than its cost of production can afford to purchase it. However, the
tying firm would insist that its customers purchase the necessary complement from it
alone. The discrimination arises in that some consumers will use the tying product more
than others and thus will require more of the tied product. By charging a
supracompetitive price for the tied product, a firm can extract more profit from heavy
users of the tying product than light users. The principle is precisely analogous to
charging a higher, direct price to a consumer whose price elasticity of demand is lower
than another’s.
Crucially, tying arrangements, utilized as “metering devices,” may solve the
ubiquitous problem faced by monopolists seeking to price discriminate—namely, the
problem of access to information about consumers’ reservation prices—as consumers
will self-select into their respective roles by their level of use of the tying product.
The fundamental issue that emerges, however, is whether product tying in the
form of price discrimination ought to be allowed under the antitrust laws. It is submitted
that the answer should be yes. While price discrimination is likely to reduce the level of
consumer surplus of those consumers who would purchase the good with or without the
discrimination, that effect is likely to be outweighed by the gains in allocative efficiency
where the level of discrimination approximates perfection.

Nevertheless, we must be cautious, for that approximation can never be exact.
With a supracompetitive price in the tied market, some restriction in output in the tying
market will take place. As long as there is some level of information symmetry,
purchasers of the tying product will take into account the supracompetitive price in the
tied market and elevate the price of the tying product accordingly. Hence, the marginal
purchaser—one who values both the tying and tied goods at their marginal costs of
production—will purchase neither, if either is sold at a supracompetitive level. In other
words, tying arrangements as metering devices for price discrimination cases necessarily
fail to achieve perfect, first degree discrimination. Accordingly, pure allocative efficiency
is not realized.
However, the extent of the restriction should not be exaggerated. While firstdegree price discrimination is highly unlikely to be observed in the real world in any
context, a tying arrangement used as a metering device, properly implemented, may come
close to approximating that result.55
There is a further beneficial feature of the use of such a tying arrangement. As it
will be to the distaste of heavy users of the tied product, the tying arrangement will create
an additional competitive advantage for a firm seeking to enter the market. When that
fact is combined with the prospect of the incumbent firm enjoying greater returns due to
the discriminatory tie-in, it follows that the incentive and ability of potential competition
to successfully enter the relevant market or markets is markedly increased. Therefore, the
employment of price discrimination may encourage entry into the monopolized, tying
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market at a faster rate than would otherwise exist, thus cutting short the period of
monopolization.
In addition to the equitable and efficiency goals highlighted above, a per se
standard of legality for price discrimination would save the extraordinarily high cost of
employing the legal system. Combining all these points, the optimal solution appears to
be to allow price discrimination. Accordingly, the use of product tying toward that end
should also be legitimate.
An important point must be raised here. Many academic commentators have
advocated the position that price discrimination ought, in fact, to be struck down entirely.
Specifically in the context of tie-ins being utilized as a metering device by which to
achieve price discrimination, Professor Barry Nalebuff has recently argued that such
facilitating tying arrangements ought to be prohibited for having a net welfare reducing
effect:

“One might first expect that price discrimination would fall under the efficiency
umbrella . . . [but] discrimination is never perfect in practice and, thus, is not as
efficiency-enhancing as this argument (and elementary textbooks) would suggest.
The reason is that customers will go to great lengths to avoid being subject to
price discrimination and firms will go to great lengths to ensure consumers cannot
escape. These wasteful efforts may cause such large distortions that the end result
is a reduction in social welfare.”56
The shortcoming associated with Professor Nalebuff’s position, however, is that
his concerns will by no means apply in many of the situations in which price
discrimination may arise. It is unclear what “great lengths” consumers can in fact go to in
attempting to avoid price discrimination through product tying. Insofar as the
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discriminatory tie imposes a disutility upon a consumer, it renders him more likely to
refuse to purchase the tying good and creates a source of competition advantage by which
rivals can take his business. In effect, the disfavored tie increases the real price of the
tying product and Professor Nalebuff’s point amounts to little more than a truism.
It may be fair to suggest that firms will expend resources ensuring consumers
cannot escape. It is a well known prerequisite for successful price discrimination that
arbitrage be prevented amongst consumers. But there are two points. First, in the context
of tie-ins being employed as a metering device, a firm requiring its consumers under
contract to purchase their requirements only from it needs only to ensure that consumers
do not violate that contract. It is not apparent how enforcement of contracts—an everyday
occurrence in the business world—can be construed as involving “great lengths.” Second,
Professor Nalebuff provides no reason to believe that the costs associated with preventive
behavior are likely to exceed the benefits that may flow from the tie.
Other leading commentators have argued for a similar prohibition on price
discrimination generally, which, it may be assumed, would involve viewing price
discrimination as an objectionable goal of a tying arrangement.57 Judge Richard Posner
has presented an additional argument in furtherance of the case for regarding price
discrimination as malignant. He notes that a monopolist’s increased profits as a result of
engaging in price discrimination elevates the amount of wasteful expenditures it will be
willing to spend in obtaining its monopoly.58
Issue may be taken with this position. If the fact of increased earnings by the
winner spurs further competition to achieve monopoly, there seems to be no apparent
57
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reason why the likelihood of increased earnings will not also increase the constraining
influence of potential competition. Knowing this ex ante, any incentive to engage in
wasteful expenditures may be tempered. Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly
given the emergence of high-technology markets, there may be many instances—
particularly in intellectual property-based markets—where additional competition to
establish the industry standard and obtain a monopoly may be wholly desirable.59 This is
especially likely to be true if the model of “creative destruction” is thought to apply,
where any technology-based monopoly is likely to be transitory, as it will swiftly be
replaced by the introduction of a new, superior technology, borne as a result of the
repeated competition to establish the standard.

G. Back to the Alpha Example

We can now explain how the extreme hypothetical posed at Part I.C supra can be
construed in a pro-consumer manner.
By tying widgets and blodgets, Alpha increased consumer utility by reducing
transaction costs. As blodgets are necessary complements to widgets, they would have to
be purchased separately by consumers anyway. The additional search and negotiations
costs are saved by the tie-in. Having now obtained monopoly market share in both
markets, Alpha is nevertheless incapable of increasing its profitability mark-up beyond
the former level. Net consumer wealth cannot, therefore, be reduced. Moreover, Alpha
now internalizes the complementary nature of the tying and tied products. Accordingly,
the price of the tying product will be reduced from its former monopoly level and the
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price of the tied product will be increased. This is nevertheless Kaldor-Hicks efficient, as
the increase in wealth of consumers in the widget market will exceed the diminution of
wealth in the blodget market. In the meantime, no elimination of rival blodget
manufacturers will take place if they are more efficient than Alpha, for it will increase
Alpha’s profits to outsource production to them. Moreover, should a more efficient firm,
Beta, wish to sell blodgets directly to consumers, it will not face a barrier to entry in the
form of having to enter the market for widgets as well. This is because investment will be
forthcoming from the capital markets as the entrant’s superior efficiency will render the
probability of post-entry insolvency low. In addition, a suitable joint venturer could be
found who would enter the tying market and sell the resulting widgets to Beta for sale to
consumers in the tied market.
As a result of the tie, net consumer welfare has clearly risen and no objectionable
elimination of competitors has taken place, for the only ones displaced were less efficient
than the tying firm. Consumer harm can only be inflicted by Alpha when the tie is cut.
But as the tied market is not subject to insurmountable barriers to entry, any exercise of
monopoly power in the tied market will be ephemeral. Crucially, any attempt on the part
of Alpha to increase prices in that market to monopoly levels will be met with
considerable consumer dissatisfaction. Upon the entry of rival blodget manufacturers,
that dissatisfaction would likely result in critical loss of market share on the part of
Alpha. Knowing this ex ante, Alpha is unlikely to raise prices to monopoly levels.
The foregoing analysis may appear to argue that tie-ins are incapable of harming
consumers. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Situations do exist in which such harm can
arise and it is to those instances that this Article now turns.

IV. THE VIOLABILITY OF THE SINGLE MONOPOLY MARK-UP CONSTRAINT

The post-Chicago School of antitrust analysis has questioned the inviolability of
the single monopoly profit restriction.60 This Article takes sharp issue with this view,
believing that the constraint can never, in fact, be violated. This is not the same as saying,
however, that product tying can never be employed to anticompetitive end. Rather, it is a
way of saying that as long as the tying arrangement stays in place, a double monopoly
mark-up cannot be employed. Interestingly, however, a broad consumer welfare standard
may find harm even in the absence of allocative inefficiency, albeit in narrow
circumstances. It will be shown that the possibility of allocative inefficiency arises only
when the tie is cut, but that, paradoxically, the end of the tying arrangement likely renders
any associated harm ephemeral.
This Part will seek both to demonstrate the limits of the single monopoly mark-up
constraint as a predictor of benign market outcomes and to outline the shortcomings of
the leading academic authors who have considered the issue.
The classic Chicago School found tying arrangements inherently benign.61 This
position is unconvincing and four situations will be highlighted in which consumer harm
may flow from a tie. These are: instances of regulation, efficiency asymmetry, barriers to
entry, and certain new economy industry settings. A ubiquitous feature in all of these
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situations will be extreme assumptions, unlikely to be met in real life. It follows that
tying arrangements should enjoy a strong presumption of validity, though this
presumption should be stronger in the case of fixed-proportions bundling than for
variable-proportions requirements contracts. The reason for this distinction lies in the
probability of information asymmetry, from which consumer harm may flow.
Before considering the possible instances of consumer harm flowing from tying
arrangements, however, it is important to consider the post-Chicago criticism of the
single monopoly profit constraint.

A. Professor Kaplow: Reviving the Leverage Theory

In 1985, Professor Louis Kaplow produced a highly influential article aimed at
reviving the discredited theory of monopoly leveraging and exposing a number of the
weaknesses contained in the classic Chicago School analysis of the economic effects of
product tying.62 Noting that school’s position that extension of monopoly via tying is
impossible, Professor Kaplow argues that there may be a number of circumstances where
the pure transfer of monopoly power from one market to another may be highly
objectionable. Unfortunately, the work is rather abstract and conclusory, lacking the
specific illustrations required to render Professor Kaplow’s points convincing.
Professor Kaplow seeks to discredit the single monopoly mark-up constraint by
arguing that it fails to distinguish between the exercise of monopoly power in tying and
tied markets. In effect, he argues that even if only one monopoly mark-up can be charged,
it does matter which market it’s charged in. Professor Kaplow proceeds by analogizing
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how market power is exercised with a terrorist carrying a single stick of dynamite. He
writes:

“The basic mistake in [the Chicago School’s] central thesis is that antitrust law
should be indifferent to the exploitation of monopoly power because extant power
is a fixed sum and thus will result in the same damage regardless of how it is
deployed . . . Consider the case of a terrorist on the loose with one stick of
dynamite. The fixed sum thesis posits that since the power is fixed–that is, the
terrorist has one and only one dynamite stick–we should be indifferent to where
the dynamite is placed. It is all too obvious, however, that the potential damage
resulting from power in this context . . . is overwhelmingly dependent upon how it
may be used.”63

This, standing on its own as it does in the article, is insufficient to accurately carry
the point, for it is difficult to relate to the specific facts of any particular monopolist. In
addition, Professor Kaplow makes two critical errors.
First, he gives the impression that a monopolist may be able to employ its market
power through product tying far more feasibly than is likely to be the case in the real
world. We have already seen that such “freedom” is, for the most part, illusory. An
undertaking, even one with monopoly power within a certain market, is not free to
exercise that power in any market it chooses. Just to gain market share in a tied market—
distinct from market power, as provided by the single monopoly profit constraint—
requires more than monopoly market power in the tying market. It requires that the only
consumers of the tied product be those who also consume the tying product and derive a
higher level of utility from the latter. These are extreme assumptions. Moreover, unless
the tying firm has a complete monopoly in the tying market, any attempt to impose an
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unwanted tie on consumers will lead them to shift their purchases to the tying firm’s
rivals. Even where a pure monopoly exists, the existence of an unwelcome tie provides an
avenue of competitive advantage for a firm wishing to enter the tying market. The
analogy with the terrorist looks weak.
Professor Kaplow’s second fundamental error lies in thinking that there is
necessarily a difference in societal wealth depending on where a monopolist’s power is
exercised. Professor Kaplow’s concerns can be conclusively demonstrated to be baseless
with respect to fixed proportions bundling. Where two products are tied in fixed
proportions, the level of wealth is precisely the same. Where requirements contracts in
variable proportions are at issue, it is in all but the most limited circumstances—such as
where the tying market is subject to price regulation—immaterial from which market the
monopoly rent is said to come. In general, the inherent efficiencies in a tie, the realization
of complementary effects, and efficiency-enhancing price discrimination combine to
ensure a consumer-welfare enhancing outcome.
In the regulatory context, however, a company may bypass its regulation by
exercising monopoly power in the free tied market instead of the regulated tying market.
This leads to a wealth transfer from consumers to the monopolist, but interestingly not to
a significant diminution in industrial output and allocative efficiency. These
considerations will be assessed in Part IV.B infra and ultimately found to warrant
prohibition.
Whatever about the variable proportions example, Professor Kaplow’s point can
be entirely eviscerated with respect to bundling. Where goods are sold in fixed
proportions, it doesn’t make the slightest difference whether the monopoly power is

exercised over the tying or tied market, for the single price paid by the consumer will be
exactly the same. Therefore, the misallocation of society’s resources through the exercise
of monopoly pricing and the level of overall output will both be the same, as will the
overall price.
Thus, Professor Kaplow’s statement that “just as it matters where the terrorist
leaves the stick of dynamite, it also matters how a firm chooses to exercise the power that
it has” is facile and conclusory. It assumes that the firm has the same freedom to choose
where to exercise its market power as does the terrorist in choosing his target and that the
difference in damage caused by the monopolist’s choice of target is comparable. But, in
the vast majority of cases, a firm has the ability neither to alter market outcomes with a
tie-in nor to change consumer behavior by seeking to exercise power in one tied market
over another.
The genuine instances in which tying arrangements may be capable of harming
consumer welfare will now be addressed.

B. The First Danger: Barriers to Entry and Industry Regulation

A classic Harvard School argument against tying is that it serves an exclusionary
function, by erecting barriers to entry.64 A firm wishing to enter the tied market must first
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enter the tying one, in circumstances in which it would otherwise choose not to. It will be
demonstrated that this concern is without substance.
Objectionable exclusion may be defined as the exclusion of an equally or more
efficient competitor. Importantly, should a situation arise in which a potential or actual
competitor in the tied market is able to provide the relevant product or service at lower
cost than the tying firm, it is highly unlikely that entry will be foreclosed. This is so for
several reasons.
First, it is in the economic self-interest of the incumbent firm engaged in product
tying to contract with the more efficient company; that is, to effectively outsource
production.65 Doing so will lower the tying firm’s costs and increase its profits. Should a
tying firm decline to contract with a more efficient potential entrant, it will be acting
contrary to its first order condition for profit maximization.
Second, even if the incumbent acts irrationally and forecloses entry, the potential,
more efficient, entrant has a strong incentive to enter the market anyway. This raises the
somewhat controversial issue of whether having to enter two markets instead of one
constitutes a significant barrier to entry. But this also demonstrates the considerable
weakness of the “entry barriers” objection to product tying, for it is based on the
assumption that the tying firm will behave contrary to its own financial interest.
An anticompetitive outcome will arise only if there is an efficiency asymmetry
between the tying firm in the tying market and the potential entrant and any joint
venturers. Take the situation where the incumbent is more efficient in producing the tying
product than the potential entrant, but less efficient in producing the tied product. In this
situation, the efficient outcome would involve the potential entrant entering the tied
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market.66 Imagine Alpha is the incumbent engaged in product tying while Beta is the
potential entrant.
There are a number of points to make here. First, that Alpha may be more
efficient than Beta at manufacturing the tying product does not mean that Beta will be
unable to find a third party who would be more efficient than Alpha and who would be
willing to engage in a joint venture with Beta. Second, the current asymmetry in
efficiency does not alter in any way the fundamental observation that it is in Alpha’s
interest to contract with Beta.
Nevertheless, in the necessarily restricted and likely to be illogical circumstances
where Alpha nonetheless refuses to accommodate Beta, economic efficiency may be
damaged. Even then, however, such harm must be weighed against the increased
efficiency caused through the joint sale of complementary products. Assuming arguendo
that there are no efficiencies in this case, does it follow that product tying in this
particular market should be struck down? The answer is yes, though this requires a
quixotic assumption that the courts will be able to reliably differentiate relatively efficient
from inefficient complaining rivals. It is interesting, nonetheless, to note that the tying
market need not be characterized by barriers to entry for a tie-in to have an
anticompetitive effect in this example. This will typically not be the case.
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It may also be efficient for the potential entrant to enter the tying market in this case
where the incumbent is a monopolist in that market. Where the less efficient firm’s perfectly
competitive price is less than the monopoly price of the more efficient firm, the former’s presence
is capable of having a constraining effect on the latter’s behavior, thereby improving the
allocative efficiency of the market. For the present purposes, however, we shall focus on entry
into the tied market, as we are concerned with the alleged creation of barriers to entry thereto.

A more serious issue does arise with respect to entry barriers, however. The single
monopoly profit constraint lasts only as long as the accompanying tie. When that tie is
severed, the relevant firm will be capable of raising price.
Imagine that a monopolist begins tying the sale of its monopolized good to a
neighboring market where there is competition. Assume that the conditions are such that
monopolization of the tied market takes place. We have seen that the tying firm will not
be able to enjoy a monopoly profit in excess of that which originally existed. Once
monopolization of the tied market has taken place, however, the tying firm can sever the
tie. At this moment, the constraint no longer applies
We now arrive at a critical issue: the ubiquitous question of barriers to entry. If
the tied market is characterized by entry barriers, the tying firm will be able to sever the
tie and earn monopoly profits in both the tying and tied markets. But an important fact
should be noted: the relevant issue is the extent of barriers after the tie has been severed,
not the extent of barriers during the time of the tie. Accordingly, the traditional argument
that tie-ins create entry barriers by requiring a potential entrant to enter both the tying and
tied markets together— provided by the Harvard School, embraced by the Warren Court,
and perpetuated in existence to present day—is irrelevant. Why? Because any barrier
created by such a tying arrangement will no longer exist when the barrier issue becomes
illuminative on the question of market power.
Accordingly, tie-ins should be subjected to higher levels of scrutiny when the tied
market is subject to considerable barriers to entry. As a general matter, however, we can
be skeptical about the existence of such barriers.67 Mere expense involved in entering a
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market should not suffice, nor should efficiencies of incumbent firms, such as economies
of scale or lower costs of production. As competition policy seeks to promote consumer
welfare, viewing efficiencies as constituent elements of a dominant position punishes
firms for success and for benefiting those consumers.68
That stringent capital requirements exist in relation to entering a market used
invariably to be regarded as a barrier to entry that increased the potential market power of
incumbent firms.69 Under this view, barriers to entry in the form of heavy capital
requirements for entry decrease the elasticity of demand for incumbent firms. That view
has, however, come under attack and the opinion is now widely held that capital markets
operate at least reasonably efficiently so that undertakings wishing to enter a market may
do so by borrowing the money it requires. From this point of view, stringent capital
requirements for entry into a market do not equate to a barrier to entry.70 Nevertheless,
certain entry barriers do exist.
One instance of genuine entry barriers arises in markets where risk is associated
with entry coupled with high investment costs. Here, the cost of capital may be rendered
excessively high due to the risk of insolvency upon entry.71 This will impede access even
to efficient markets. Where such outcomes are likely, a potential entrant may face a
considerable barrier to entry in the form of high cost of capital. Nevertheless, such
instances are rare.
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By far the most worrisome form of entry barrier is provided by government
regulation. In fact, it is within this context that product tying warrants special scrutiny.
Here, the relevant entry barrier exists with respect to the tying market.
Firms providing an essential service or product will often be granted a statutory
monopoly and subjected to price regulation, particularly in the natural monopoly context.
Rate of return or price cap regulation seeks to impose a pricing regime that will
approximate perfect competition. Accordingly, even though a regulated firm granted a
statutory monopoly will enjoy a monopolistic position and potential monopoly power,
that power cannot be exercised. A firm may attempt to employ a tying strategy to transfer
this power to a tied market where it can be exercised. Is this objectionable?
The Chicago School holds that it is not. Representatively, Professor Bowman
argued that such tying by a regulated company is benign due to the fact that no additional
market power has been created.72 Under this “fixed-sum” hypothesis, he argued that no
antitrust objection should follow as the undertaking in question has not increased its
market power:

“Only when freedom to set the price of the monopolized product is denied can a
tie-in of two products used in fixed proportions become useful . . . The imposition
of a tie-in under these circumstances determines the identity of the seller, but the
amount of the tied product actually sold will not differ at all from that which
could be sold if the optimum price for the tying product were set. The seller has
only established a new method of exercising his already existing monopoly in the
regulated product. Leverage, therefore, does not exist when the proportions of the
two products are fixed.”73
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It is true that a regulated monopolist, engaged in bundling, cannot restrict output
in the tied market even if it successfully leverages monopoly power to that market. As
output in the tying market is at the competitive level by virtue of regulation, the number
of tied goods sold cannot be reduced, for they are sold in fixed proportions. Therefore,
allocative efficiency cannot be hindered by a regulated monopolist’s bundling strategy. In
this respect, Professor Bowman is undoubtedly correct. His error arises in concluding that
a lack of allocative inefficiency renders the practice in question benign. An important
question remains to be asked: what of consumer welfare? A regulated monopolist’s
exercise of monopoly power in a tied market, even if it does not restrict output, still
involves a transfer payment from consumers and, in the absence of any off-setting
benefit, may be a valid ground for forbidding the tie.
In the regulated industry setting, there is no concomitant gain to accompany the
wealth transfer. This stands in marked contrast to the phenomenon of price discrimination
discussed in Part III.F supra. Nevertheless, a per se condemnation of bundling in the
regulatory context would be myopic, for countless manifestations of inherent efficiencies
will be found there, as everywhere. Where there is no restriction in output, no distortion
in market outcomes, yet a significant likelihood of efficiencies, per se illegality seems
improper. Instead, the burden should be on a regulated firm to demonstrate the existence
of demonstrable efficiencies inherent in its bundling activities. Nevertheless, this is far
removed from the Chicago position that the practice is innately benign.
In stark contrast, it can unequivocally be concluded that variable proportions tieins in the regulated industry setting should be struck down. Here, a consumer decides on
the quantity of the tied good to purchase after the sale of the tying good. Accordingly, an

increase in price in the tied market will reduce both output and allocative efficiency. This
clearly violates the Chicago approach to consumer welfare and, hence, should be
prohibited.
The wary reader may protest that this Article’s condemnation of variable
proportions tie-ins in the regulated industry setting contradicts its earlier approval of price
discrimination. After all, a regulated monopolist will use variable proportions tying
contracts to differentiate amongst its customers on the basis of the intensity of their
demand. As in the pure price discrimination example in Part III.F supra, a low price will
be charged in the tying market (here by law, not by choice), so won’t the outcome be the
same? The answer is no.
There is a critical distinction: in the regulated industry setting, the exercise of
monopoly power is not inevitable. The opportunity cost of allowing a regulated firm to
extract monopoly rents from a tied market is the possibility of pure allocative
efficiency.74If requirements contracts are banned, the regulated monopolist will not be
able to suppress output and extract consumer wealth. Outside of the regulatory setting,
the legal system relies on the free market to remedy manifestations of market power.
When subjected to regulation, natural market forces are severely eroded. Accordingly, we
cannot rely on the market to remedy tying repercussions as we do elsewhere. Hence,
striking requirements contracts in regulatory settings will forward the goals of
competition policy.
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The assumption that regulated industry is subject to perfect price control is,
unfortunately, somewhat quixotic! Nevertheless, the point holds true that product tying as a
means of price discriminating can never achieve allocative efficiency, while regulation, at least in
theory, can.

C. The Second Danger: Inherent Unfairness to Consumers

When a firm enjoys a monopolistic position in a given market, it is axiomatic that
it possesses a level of control over its customers.75 Depending on the price elasticity of
demand at the competitive price level in the market, there may be a vast array of prices a
monopolist can choose to sell at, which will all have different effects on consumer
wealth. Of course, the central economic objection to monopoly is that the undertaking
will sell goods at a price higher than the marginal cost of manufacturing the product.
Despite the unquestionable harm this inflicts upon consumers, the law elects not to
prohibit monopoly pricing, except in certain, well-defined regulatory instances..
However, the law does attempt in many cases to prohibit further abuse of consumers by a
monopolist and a law prohibiting the coerced acceptance of products not necessarily
desired by consumers would arguably be a quintessential manifestation of that principle.
When information asymmetries exist between seller and consumer, whereby the
former is in the position of superior information, the seller may be able to bypass the
boundaries created by the single monopoly mark-up “constraint.” The circumstances in
which such an outcome is most likely to arise are in situations of requirements tie-ins, as
opposed to bundling. Where both the tying and tied products are presented as a bundled
unit for the consumer’s attention, the ability of the seller to conceal disadvantageous price
or other terms with respect to the tied good is necessarily limited. In contrast, where the
focus of the sale is on the tying product only, with the tied good being the subject of a
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contractual obligation on the part of the purchaser, it is more likely that a seller will be
able to charge an above monopoly mark-up with respect to the tied product by, perhaps,
concealing the exploitative pricing term in a contract of adhesion. With a consumer’s
focus on the immediate price of the tying product which he is about to purchase, such
diminutive, though highly disadvantageous, terms buried within the provisions of a
complex contract may escape some consumers’ attention. In such situations, a seller may
be able to charge two monopoly prices. This is the first consumer welfare objection.
Nevertheless, there is little need to employ antitrust laws in this setting. The
process by which sellers conceal disadvantageous price terms is already regulated by
contract law. The doctrines of misrepresentation, undue influence, unconscionable
bargain and the like adequately protect consumers from the foregoing harm.
But there is also a second objection; one not dependent on information
asymmetries.
Whereas the first objection arose in the context of variable proportions tie-ins, the
second objection applies to both bundling and requirements tying arrangements. To
demonstrate how this second objection may arise, assume that a monopolist employs a
tying strategy and charges the profit-maximizing price equal to the sum of the monopoly
price in the tying market and the competitive price in the tied market. It has already been
shown that allocative efficiency is unaffected by such a business practice and that
attempting to charge any more than this summed price will not be profit-maximizing.
However, it can also be demonstrated that consumer welfare can be adversely affected,
which may be a valid ground for deeming a practice illegal.

Where a consumer’s reservation price in the tying market is equal to the
monopoly price and his reservation price in the tied market is equal to the competitive
price, he will accept the tying arrangement,76 though his consumer surplus will be zero. If
the joint price is raised even an infinitesimal amount, he will not purchase the tied goods
and deadweight loss will result. In the former circumstance, the tying arrangement has no
impact whatsoever on either deadweight loss or consumer welfare.
Consider the situation, however, where a consumer values the tying good at a
level greater than the monopoly price—let us arbitrarily employ the figure ten. Thus,
when such a consumer purchases the tying good at a monopoly price of six, she enjoys a
consumer surplus of four. Assume also that the consumer does not value the tied product
a great deal, so that the utility she gains from purchasing it is less than the competitive
price for that product—we shall again create an arbitrary figure of two to represent the
gulf between the price of the good and the value it would confer on the consumer. In the
absence of a tie, the consumer would purchase the tying product, but not the tied one.
Consumer surplus would be four.
Imagine now, however, that the monopolist in the tying market employs a tying
strategy, with the single, joint price again equaling the sum of the monopoly price in the
tying market and the competitive price in the tied market. The consumer will still
purchase the bundled goods, but in doing so will only gain a consumer surplus of two. It
is clear that an objectionable instance of disutility has been imposed on the consumer and
this is a legitimate factor counseling for the prohibition of the tie. Of course, the
diminution in consumer wealth is equaled exactly by the gain to the tying firm—there is
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no deadweight loss or allocative inefficiency. It still follows, however, that there is a
clear economic objection to product tying on the basis of consumer protection.
Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that tie-ins should be struck down
on this basis. This is so for a number of reasons. First, on a pragmatic level, this problem
is systemic in tying scenarios. Accordingly, it is a cost that would have to be considered
in the antitrust assessment of every tying arrangement. It is apt to be difficult to quantify
and the extent of the harm caused likely to be slight. This latter prediction can be made
on the basis of the fact that allocative inefficiency does not result—there is no market
distortion. Second, the problem is likely to be self-correcting through natural market
forces. Third, any negative impact imposed by a tie must be weighed against the potential
gains society may derive therefrom.
Considering the self-correction principle first, it is appropriate to begin by noting
that it is unlikely that a firm, even a monopolist, will be able to impose such a disutility
on its customers for any sustained period. If some consumers are being hurt by the tie,
they will be ready and willing to purchase from a new entrant into the tying market who
offers the product in question without insisting on a tying arrangement. This fact is
rendered even stronger by the fact that a monopolist that coerces its customers into
accepting products they do not want will suffer a significant loss of goodwill, which will
aid any potential entrant’s attempt to move into the market. Where the market is likely to
self-correct insofar as consumer welfare is concerned and there are a potential plethora of
legitimate, efficiency-enhancing justifications for the practice of tie-ins, which represent
the second ground, there is good reason to decline to automatically strike tying

arrangements on the basis of consumer protection. It is clear, however, that the issue
returns to the ever-present question about barriers to entry.
A principle of ubiquitous and determinative importance throughout the economic
analysis of product tying, the significance of the concept of barriers to entry is no less
pressing here. It would seem to be the case that where a tying market is one characterized
by low or at least practically surmountable entry barriers—as it apt to be the case in the
vast majority of situations—then the efficiency-maximizing approach is to decline to
condemn the tie as being contrary to the competition laws unless other features of the tie
call for such prohibition. On the other hand, if it can be shown that entry into the market
is likely to be frustrated, then a strong argument exists for striking the tie unless other
efficiency-enhancing aspects of the tie outweigh the harm to consumer welfare.

V. PRODUCT TYING IN THE NEW ECONOMY

The so-called “new economy,” in which technological progress has led to the
development of markets predominantly producing output in the form of intellectual
property,77 has created a plethora of new questions for antitrust policy. This is so as
traditional antitrust jurisprudence has been aimed at those industries with eventual rising
average costs in production.78 New economy industries are not characterized by such cost
functions, but rather by continuously declining marginal cost in production. This is
because the product development cycle revolves around initial capital-intensive
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investment followed by cheap, or virtually free, dissemination.79 Antitrust policy in
traditional markets aims to increase competition in production. Doing so leads, ceteris
paribus, as well as to elevated productive and allocative efficiency. In the new economy,
it may be that the most important form of competition is in establishment. The unique
economic nature of new economy industries requires a novel approach for antitrust in
tying cases. Accordingly, this Part will first present an overview of the economics of
network industries and will then proceed to apply those economics to tying arrangement
scenarios.

A. The Economic Consequences of the New Economy

The first point is that network industries are characterized by positive externalities
in consumption, alternatively known as network externalities or network effects.
Essentially, the value to each consumer increases as the number of consumers utilizing
the product in question rises.80
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The classic example involves telephony. A telephone is of no use to someone if no one
else also has a telephone. The value to any person with a phone will increase as the number of
people subscribing to the telephone network rises. In contrast, traditional markets, such as
markets for automobiles, clothing, food, drink and so on, have no such characteristics—when
someone purchases a car, he cares little, if at all, about whether other people are also purchasing
similar vehicles. This, of course, is not to say that network effects are entirely absent from
traditional industries. Indeed, in this example there may be negative externalities in
consumption—as the number of people owning and using cars increases, the value to a particular
person of owning a car may decline due to congestion. It will be noted, however, that some
positive network externalities remain—for example, as the number of cars increase, the number
of garages, independent sellers and so on also increase, which all add to the value to any one
person owning a car. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the kind of network effects associated
with traditional products are typically modest in comparison to the characteristics of markets for
intellectual property.
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The significance of network effects is that they lead—inexorably if the effects are
strong enough—to a situation where a “winner takes all” situation emerges as a result of
“tipping effects.” In such circumstances, the first product or standard to achieve
widespread consumer acceptance may capture the entire market, even if subsequent
alternatives are of lower cost. As the value of purchasing the relevant good to the
incremental buyer increases further as consumers continue to purchase the product, there
is a natural tendency toward monopolization. It should be clear why the traditional model
emphasizing competition does not apply to this situation: it is unlikely that even an
oligopolistic structure can survive, as consumers’ utility is maximized by having one
standard only. The result is that firms engage in competition in a radically different
way.81
A counteracting feature of network industries, however, is that beneficial
competition may instead occur in establishment, rather than production.82 The argument
is that firms will initially compete on the basis of quality and, to a lesser extent, price, on
the belief that consumers are likely to elect the standard or product that conveys the
highest utility. However, the efficiency of this model may not be infallible. It is possible
that a “winner takes all” structure can lead to the kind of “gold rush” that may be socially
wasteful.83
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Imagine that twenty firms compete to establish a new standard for word processing on
PC computers. Due to the strong network effects associated with the program, monopolization is
certain to result and the degree of learning with the software is such that consumers are
effectively “locked-in.” As a result, the winner will enjoy future monopoly profits indefinitely.83
We will assume that all ten firms will innovate to equivalent degrees of success and will therefore
each have, ex ante, a 5% chance of winning. Imagine that there are two markets that the firms
could enter. In the first market, there is little or no risk, so that each firm could employ its capital
83

Is this objection necessarily determinative? The initially surprising answer is no.
If we believe that competition to establish a standard increases the eventual quality of the
standard thus established, the issue becomes one of whether the value of the capital
foregone by the firms which were unsuccessful in setting the standard is exceeded by the
greater utility passed onto consumers by the superior technology. If we expect the latter
to indeed outweigh the former, the issue then is whether the allocative inefficiency
caused by monopoly is greater than the value created by the technology.
On this point, the nature of the technological market is such that the kind of
objectionable monopolization associated with winner takes all markets is likely to be
ephemeral.84 This is so due to the high rate of technological innovation, whereby
incumbent standards are apt to be rendered obsolete over relatively short amounts of
time. Therefore, competition in achieving the industry standard is likely to outweigh the
output-restricting effects of competition in production.
It follows that the overall consequence from an antitrust perspective of certain
technological markets being characterized by network effects is that particular attention
must be focused on the possibility of incumbent monopolists employing exclusionary
practices to frustrate the process of creative destruction. This observation has powerful
to earn $1000 per annum. In the second market, which is our hypothetical market for word
processing, the winner would earn $100,000 and the losers nothing. At this point, the optimal
outcome must be identified.
The optimal outcome would be for one of the twenty firms to enter the “winner takes all”
market, earn $100,000 and for the remaining nineteen firms to enter the “sure bet” market and
earn a total of $19,000. The total income in the two markets would be $119,000.
Of course, the problem of collective action ensures that such an outcome will not be
reached. Instead, each firm will invest in the winner takes all market until its expected return is
equal to the opportunity cost of entering the sure bet market—namely, $1000. Therefore, five
firms will compete to establish the industry standard in the winner takes all market, while the
remaining fifteen firms will invest in the sure thing market. The total income would be
1*$100,000 + 15*$1,000 = $115,000. There has been a social loss of $4000 caused by wasteful
competition.
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ramifications for the current focus on product tying and bundling, for such practices may
conceivably be employed to objectionable ends in high-technology, intellectual property
industries characterized by externalities in consumption.
A second major feature of modern network industries is that consumers may face
significant switching costs in attempting to move from an incumbent firm to a
competitor. Such costs arise in the context of network industries due to the difficulty
inherent in mastering many of the forms that intellectual property-based products take.
Moreover, switching costs are increased further when consumers make additional
investments on the basis of their understanding of the product in question.85 An obvious
example is provided by software applications or operating systems. Oz Shy writes:

“Learning to master a particular operating system such as Windows,
UNIX, DOS, or a Macintosh takes time . . . It is an established fact that
users are very much annoyed by having to switch between operating
systems.”86
It ought to be immediately apparent that this characteristic will have significant
repercussions for competition policy, for it will have an inevitable effect on the ability of
superior competition to take market share away from established, incumbent rivals.
Switching costs significantly decrease the price elasticity of demand for those consumers
who are “locked-in,” meaning that an incumbent firm can further raise price.
A further result of switching costs is closely related to an effect caused by network
externalities—namely, that there is likely to be highly significant, initial competition to
attract as many consumers as possible. In the case of network effects, the initial
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competition is to establish the industry standard so as to obtain a monopolistic position.
With switching costs, the greater the market share a firm can initially obtain, the stronger
its long-term market position will be. In both situations, one would expect to see extreme
instances of price- and quality-based competition upon entry. Moreover, and most
relevantly for the current assessment of product tying, firms are likely to provide bundled
products so as to increase its customer base and to further augment the extent to which its
customers are locked-in. It is clear that tying arrangements could conceivably be
employed at a loss by a firm with significant financial resources so as to acquire market
share ahead of a more efficient rival. Additionally, bundling could plausibly be employed
to reinforce the dominant position of an undertaking within a market the consumers of
which face switching costs. It follows, therefore, that tying arrangements must be viewed
with additional scrutiny in markets where consumers may become “locked-in.”

B. The Competitive Effect of Product Tying in Modern Network Industries

The unique concern in the new economy setting is that tying may be employed
not in the sense usually thought of—that is, by wishing to monopolize a tied market—but
instead to consolidate market power within the tying market. By inducing consumers to
utilize its products to a higher degree, a tying firm may induce “consumer lock-in”
through network externalities. Once such lock-in has been established, the company may
then be able to raise price in the tying market. Crucially, though, the tying product must
not be one capable of on-line distribution, for if it is, barriers to entry will be dramatically
lowered. Assume momentarily, then, that the tying product is for hardware and the tied

product is for software. A consumer’s use of the tied product may induce “lock-in” with
respect to the hardware.
If this concern is valid, tie-ins in the new economy setting could present a
significantly greater threat than those appearing in more traditional settings. The
foregoing economic assessment of tying—agnostic and skeptical in its approach—may
not be universally applicable. Fortunately, a more insightful analysis reveals that this
need not be true and that tying arrangements are as likely to be consumer-welfare
enhancing in this environment as any other.
The concern of tying arrangements “locking” customers into high-technology
markets is subject to the criticism that it rests on static analysis. Adding dynamic effects
to the model may render the objectionable effects of the tie in these markets ephemeral.87
A defining feature of the many high-technology markets which are characterized
by a high rate of innovation is that: (1) quality trumps price88 and (2) innovation rates are
so high that standards quickly become obsolete.89 In the latter regard, a firm enjoying a
dominant position within a winner takes all, intellectual property market will find itself
quickly being displaced should it fail to keep up with technological developments. This
fact is facilitated by the former feature of these markets, which markedly decreases
barriers to entry.
When a firm’s product, formerly the industry standard, is rendered obsolete by
virtue of enhanced technology in the hands of rival contemplating entry, the relevant
question is whether entry barriers are such as to prevent the emergence and ultimate
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consumer acceptance of the rival technology. We have already seen how strong network
effects and incompatibility can combine to create powerful barriers to entry. Ironically,
however, it is the winner takes all characteristic causing entry barriers that also facilitates
entry when a significantly superior standard emerges. Consumers in high-technology
markets place a far greater emphasis on quality than on price. The result of this is twofold: a superior standard, once introduced to an already-monopolized market, is likely to
cause a swift movement away from the incumbent to the new entrant, and the new entrant
can achieve this while charging prices higher than the prevailing market price for the
outdated technology so as to recover the expense of research and development.
These insights bring us full circle: it appears, after all, that the economic
distinction between tie-ins employed in the so-called “new economy” and traditional
markets is not as significant as would first appear. The processes by which the markets
operate are unquestionably different, but this may not alter the observation that natural,
undisturbed market forces will pave an inevitable path toward efficient behavior in both
contexts.
It does not follow from this insight that tie-ins cannot be employed to the
detriment of consumers in high-technology markets. Instead, the competitive effects of a
tie within such a market must be judged with respect to the level of continuing innovation
within the field.
In addition, however, tie-ins could be employed in a traditional manner, though in
the new economy setting. Here, a tying firm may seek to gain market share in a tied
market. Importantly, the competitive issues are no different from traditional industries,
though one aspect is noteworthy: barriers to entry in many intellectual property markets

may be unusually low when on-line distribution can take place. Accordingly, should a
tying firm, having successfully “monopolized” a tied market for software, attempt to
sever the tie and charge a monopoly price for the tied market, rivals wishing to enter the
market may be able do so instantaneously and at low cost.
In conclusion, tying arrangements within high technology, intellectual propertybased markets must be subjected to a different form of antitrust scrutiny than those
employed within more traditional contexts.90 The fundamental observation that
anticompetitive effect is unlikely to result remains the same, though the facts under which
that assumption breaks down are markedly different. The level of innovation within the
relevant market constitutes the fundamental target of the relevant antitrust analysis.

VI. A NEW LEGAL STANDARD

Adherents to Chicago and post-Chicago thought believe that U.S. antitrust law
governing tying arrangements is in dire need of review.91 The case for rejecting the
modified per se rule is compelling.92 Nevertheless, disagreement exists on what the ideal
legal standard should be.
Chicagoans have called for a per se legal approach.93 For the many reasons
discussed above, this would not be an ideal outcome. Instances have been highlighted in
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which consumer harm can follow the initiation of tying arrangements. A legal standard
failing to recognize and counter such instances would be inherently flawed.
Post-Chicagoans, although hard to pin down as a single group, would typically
desire a rule of reason approach, in which dynamic game theoretic models could be
employed

to

identify

anti-competitive

outcomes.94

Demonstrable

information

asymmetries would likely render the tying arrangement suspect, as would accumulation
of monopoly market share in a tied market. Empirical observation would play a key role.
This Article advocates neither position. An ideal rule must recognize, first, that
the vast majority of tying arrangements—even those employed by firms with market
power—are apt to be efficiency- and consumer welfare-enhancing and, second, that the
instances in which anticompetitive effect may arise are isolated. Coupled with Judge
Easterbrook’s commendable view that courts should err on the side of permissibility,95
the law should be agnostic with respect the likelihood of consumer harm. This level of
skepticism should not, however, rise to the level of deniability.96 The assessment of
product tying scenarios should proceed as follows:
First, actual monopoly power on the part of the tying firm is a sine qua non for
consumer harm. Where a tying firm is dominant, but not a monopolist, no tie-in should be
held illegal. In other words, where a tying firm does not have a monopoly in the tying
market, tie-ins should enjoy per se legality.
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A strong presumption of legality should exist in all other cases, save the
following:

Tying arrangements entered into by regulated monopolists should be construed
with high levels of scrutiny. Variable proportions requirement contracts should be
subject to per se prohibition. Fixed proportions bundling, on the other hand,
should be regarded as presumptively illegal, though that presumption could be
rebutted upon a showing of overriding efficiencies.
Where a tied market is subject to unusually strong entry barriers, greater scrutiny
should arise. This scrutiny should only rise to the level of condemnation,
however, if the relationship between the tying and tied markets is such that
monopolization of the latter is likely to follow a tie-in. The constituent elements
of this relationship are: the tying firm must possess a monopoly, or virtual
monopoly, in the tying market, the only consumers of the tied product or those
that consume the tying product, and the tying product must confer higher levels of
utility than the tied product.
In the new economy setting, there are two possibilities: tie-ins may be employed
to reinforce a dominant position in a tying market, or to monopolize a tied market.
Taking the former situation: tying arrangements must be construed in light of the
level of continuing innovation in the field and the level of consumer lock-in
inherent in the market. Where innovation is slow or cyclical and where network
effects are especially strong, product tying must be closely scrutinized.

With respect to product tying as a means of monopolizing a tied market,
the usual skepticism should apply. An absolute defense should be a showing by
the tying firm that entry barriers to the tied market are especially low. This is
likely to be the case in those intellectual property-based industries where on-line
dissemination of rival products may be instantaneous and unusually cheap.
Other situations in which harm could conceivably arise are so attenuated as to be
unworthy of address. For instance, harm may occur in the rare circumstance where a
tying firm is relatively efficient in producing the tying product, but inefficient in
producing the tied product, yet refuses to contract with a more efficient firm in the tied
market. The rarity arises from the fact that the act would be contrary to the tying firm’s
self interest. Judge Easterbrook’s construction should apply here, for the market
inefficiency will inevitably break down. Moreover, rendering the tie illegal in those
circumstances would enable inefficient firms to argue that they were being excluded from
the tied market. This would ultimately lead to greater levels of harm than good. As
excluded rivals’ statements would be non-credible, the courts would inevitably struggle
to accurately assess the legitimacy of their claims. In sum, the risk of Type II errors by
the courts would be prohibitive.
CONCLUSION

There is a reason why the Chicago School has yet to appreciably influence the
courts in the realm product tying: the economic phenomena at issue are strongly counterintuitive. Tying represents a unique situation in which the possession of significant
market share may not equate to market power. Moreover, the instigation of a tying

strategy by a firm with market share demonstrably damages rivals. Although the courts
have some experience in dichotomizing harm to competitors and harm to consumers, one
inevitably struggles to conclude that tie-ins eliminating competitors are benign from
consumers’ perspective.
It is in such a context that the classic Harvard School approach—most clearly
applied by the Warren Court—proves convincing to many. The complex price theoretic
explanations for the phenomena at issue sit in conflict with the conclusions that seem
both apparent and obvious. If there is an ultimate test for the role of economics in
antitrust law, product tying is it. So far the law has failed this test by declining to adopt an
economically rigorous approach. Indeed, it was in the context of product tying that
Milton Friedman—one of the last half century’s most prominent economists—recently
declared in exasperation that the antitrust laws should be scrapped for doing more harm
than good.97
Nevertheless, there is some ground for hope. In the not too distant past, the
Supreme Court opined that “tying arrangements serve hardly any purpose beyond the
suppression of competition.”98 This erroneous view has now been rejected and the possibility
of consumer-welfare enhancing tying arrangements has been recognized.99 Better yet, there
has been some retreat from the per se approach.

The first example of a modern move in American law away from per se illegality
exists with respect to physical integration. Where two goods are physically integrated,
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which, as an economic matter, is analogous to a bundle, the law is dramatically different.
Here, legality is effectively presumed and only where a showing that the integration
serves no consumer purpose will illegality follow.100
The second arises with regard to the new economy. The Microsoft case saw the
D.C. Circuit enunciate a rule of reason approach to product tying in the context of hightechnology, software markets.101 This is a tremendously encouraging decision and one
that is consistent with the economic analysis conducted heretofore.
Nevertheless, Harvard thinking remains firmly engrained in much of the law
governing product tying. This Article has attempted to demonstrate the critical
shortcomings of the current law by focusing on Chicago-oriented principles of
microeconomics. Interestingly, however, the Chicago position itself has been too facile,
for situations do exist in which product tying may be utilized in a manner detrimental to
consumers.
Accordingly, the author has sought to identify the deficiencies of the Chicago
approach to tying and to advocate a legal standard by which to satisfy what ought to be
the sole goal of antitrust—the maximization of consumer welfare.
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